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Abstract
This article explains in outline how religious rights and freedoms are 
protected in South Africa's transitional constitution. It not only deals with 
these rights and freedoms as such, but also with related rights and freedoms 
which amplify and enhance constitutional entitlements in the religious 
sphere. The operation o f section 14 o f  the constitution (in which religious 
rights and freedoms are mentioned by name) and o f  related provisions is 
also discussed with reference to the operation o f  the bill o f  rights as a 
whole.
The freedom o f religion provisions in the constitution are furthermore as­
sessed in view o f
* a clause proposed as an addendum to a Declaration on Religious 
Rights and Responsibilities approved and adopted by a National Inter- 
Faith Conference held under the auspices o f the South African Chap­
ter o f  the World Conference on Religion and Peace, and (to a lesser 
extent)
* certain universally accepted standards fo r  the protection o f  religious 
rights and freedoms.
Specific articles o f  the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities 
itself are also taken into account but the declaration as a whole is not con­
sidered.
1. Background
The object o f this contribution is to plot the parameters within which religious 
rights are protected in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights (chapter 3) in South 
Africa’s transitional constitution. The freedom o f religion clause (section 14) and 
provisions amplifying and enhancing it (see 5. below) cannot be fully understood 
in isolation. The genesis o f chapter 3 and the hermeneutical context constituted
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by the chapter as a whole will therefore first briefly be looked at.
On only one occasion have a diversity of organised religious communities in 
South Africa indicated a shared preference for a specific freedom o f religion 
clause in a bill o f rights. This proposed clause was included as an addendum to 
the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities which was finally ap­
proved and adopted by a National Inter-Faith Conference held in Pretoria (from 
22 to 24 November 1992) under the auspices o f  the South African Chapter o f the 
World Conference on Religion and Peace. The freedom o f religion provisions in 
South Africa’s transitional bill o f rights will be assessed in view o f both this pro­
posed clause (hereinafter referred to as the W.C.R.P.-S.A. proposed clause) and, 
to a lesser extent, certain universally accepted standards for the protection o f reli­
gious rights and freedoms. Specific articles o f the Declaration on Religious 
Rights and Responsibilities agreed on by the National Inter-Faith Conference will 
also be taken into account but the declaration as a whole will not be considered.
2. The genesis o f  the Chapter on Fundam ental Rights
The Negotiating Council o f the Multi-Party Negotiating Process in Kempton Park 
appointed seven technical committees -  o f which the Technical Committee on 
Fundamental Rights during the Transition was one -  to assist it in its deliberations 
in key areas. The Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights was informed 
that its first task would be to compile a limited list o f fundamental rights to be en­
trenched during the transition. Agreeing to this list in the plenary sessions o f the 
negotiating council turned out to be a tug o f war between minimalists and op- 
timalists which, in the end, resulted in a compromise.
The minimalists, mainly the African National Congress and its allies, argued that 
the list should include only those rights indispensable to the political process o f 
transition. The optimalists, on the other hand, which were mainly parties who 
later withdrew from the Negotiating Process to form the Freedom Alliance, con­
tended for the fullest possible list o f rights. The South African Government-Na­
tional Party alliance initially also signalled preference for the optimalist position 
but not at all costs.
The minimalist position coincided with the broader political view that the Multi- 
Party Negotiating Council, as an insufficiently representative -  and therefore not 
really legitimate -  political forum, could at most agree to a transitional constitution. 
A more representative legislative cum constituent assembly, elected in terms of 
the transitional constitution, would eventually have to decide on a final constitu­
tion. The minimalists were mainly those parties and alliances believed to enjoy 
majority popular support. The optimalist position, on the other hand, was under­
pinned by a strongly held view that the Multi-Party Negotiating Council was the
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appropriate authority to decide on a final constitution which should -  especially in 
its chapter on fundamental rights -  embody the fullest possible number of ab­
solute guarantees pertaining to a ‘final’ dispensation. The optimalists were par­
ties and alliances with vested political power interests but limited popular support 
fearing marginalisation in a proportionally representative constitution-making 
process.
The Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights was mandated to identify those 
rights which would be ‘fundamental to the transition’ but was not told how long 
the transition was expected to last and precisely how fundamental the rights iden­
tified had to be. The technical committee, in its first progress report, listed the 
rights which it regarded as basic to the functioning o f a democratic system o f go­
vernment. In its second and third progress reports it formulated criteria for the 
inclusion of rights in the transitional constitution. The negotiating council at no 
stage really approved of these criteria but agreed to the inclusion o f the list of 
rights contained in the technical committee’s third progress report.
This list o f rights is, from a jurisprudential point o f view, neither fatally anorectic 
nor satisfactorily comprehensive. Significant second generation (socio-economic) 
and third generation (‘green’ and group) rights had, for instance, not been in­
cluded in the final list. The few rights in these two categories which were indeed 
included (with the exception o f children’s rights in section 30) enjoy but restric­
ted protection and the sections entrenching them are also restrictively phrased.
The often conflicting ideological or ‘philosophical’ forces at work in the process 
o f drafting chapter 3 can be classified with reference to two human rights tradi­
tions which have become visible in South Africa over the last fifty years, namely 
a libertarian and a liberationist tradition. These traditions are both ‘liberal’ in 
the sense that they share a basic commitment to a quintessence o f liberal-demo­
cratic values, but they do so with a marked difference in emphasis.
The proponents o f the libertarian tradition have mainly been white liberals who 
have expressed their opposition to authoritarian government and to apartheid in 
(‘the old’) South Africa in human rights terms. They have, however, during es­
pecially the last three years been joined by newcomers from the ranks o f those 
who used to help uphold the apartheid regime but who have come to realise that 
the entrenchment o f their basic rights in a libertarian vein could in future best 
serve their vested interests.
Ideologically the libertarian tradition draws heavily on classical (enlightenment) 
liberalism and contends for a bill o f rights premising its value system on indivi­
dual liberty (and not equality) as a core value. In respect o f state authority vis á 
vis individual autonomy libertarians assume an abstentionist (or ‘hands-off) atti­
tude.
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The liberationist tradition became South Africa’s first visible human rights tradi­
tion with the adoption, in 1943, o f the African National Congress document, Afri­
can Claims in South Africa, followed by the Freedom Charter in 1955. In these 
formative documents rights sentiments are, generally speaking, expressed as a 
combination o f political ideals and demands. The ideological underpinnings of 
the liberationist tradition range from social democracy to democratic socialism, 
with the former probably predominating at present. The liberationist tradition is, 
at any rate, markedly egalitarian in its basic approach.
The liberationist and libertarian traditions share a profound loyalty to a distinct 
core o f time -  honoured liberal and democratic values which includes an unques­
tioning deference to freedom o f conscience, religion and belief. Negotiating par­
ties, moreover, seemed to have shared the view that walls o f separation between 
church/religion and state/politics are undesirable. All this explains why the con- 
stitutionalisation o f the rights implied by these freedoms was preponderantly un- 
contentious. However, the right to establish educational institutions based on, 
amongst others, a common religion (see section 32(c) and 5.1 below) was poten­
tially contentious since it can be exercised in such a way that it serves as a pretext 
for ‘privatised’ discrimination. This explains why its possible constitutionalisa- 
tion was used as a ‘bargaining chip’ in bilateral discussions between the govern­
ment and the ANC and why it was eventually entrenched subject to an explicit 
prohibition o f racial discrimination (see further 5.1 below).
3. The context o f  the Chapter on Fundam ental Rights
3.1 Its style
The provisions of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights are couched in a language 
reflecting preference for a particular style o f formulation in which entitlements are 
expressed as general norms, as broadly as possible, and reliance on lists o f speci­
fic and detailed guarantees and conditions have been avoided (see in general 
Corder et al., 1992:17-18; see also the Fifth Progress Report o f the Technical 
Committee on Fundamental Rights par. 2). This is in stark contrast with the in­
flation o f language characterising the traditional way o f formulating statutes in 
South Africa using ‘many words to say few things’. There are major advantages 
to a bill o f rights using few words to say many things:
* It allows for the use o f simple language which is readily accessible to the 
citizenry. The rights and freedoms as expressed in the bill o f rights can re­
latively easily be understood and the formulations can become part o f  eve­
ryday usage instead o f remaining the province o f lawyers.
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* In constitutional review proceedings complicated formulations are likely to 
focus attention on the ‘true meaning’ of words and phrases rather than the 
really crucial question whether a right or freedom has been infringed.
* Detailed provisions containing elaborate itemisations may actually limit the 
protection they profess to provide as a result o f the application o f interpre­
tive techniques currently used by South African courts. A judge faced with 
a provision containing a long list of particular items which are protected (or 
prohibited) may, for instance, conclude that related items which are not 
listed but could just as well have been included, should be taken to be ex­
cluded from the protection (or prohibition) (inclusio unius est alterius ex- 
clusio). A similar limitation of the protective effect o f a bill o f rights may 
result from the application of what have become known as the rules o f re­
strictive interpretation.
* Broadly phrased provisions allow for the evolutionary interpretation and 
growth o f the instrument which entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms.
South African courts have thus far been essentially literalist in their approach to 
the interpretation o f legislation (Du Plessis & De Ville, 1993a:78-81). This ap­
proach is wholly inappropriate in interpreting a broadly phrased bill o f rights and 
could indeed have startling consequences (see e.g. Du Plessis & De Ville, 
1993a:73-76). A ‘contextually sensitive’ (or holistic) and purposive approach is 
called for instead.1 The wording o f chapter 3 is conducive to this latter more 
appropriate approach.
3.2 Its application
Chapter 3 o f the transitional constitution is introduced by a provision stating that 
the chapter shall bind the legislative and executive organs of the state at all levels 
o f government (section 7(1)) which, according to the definition clause (section 
232), includes all statutory bodies and functionaries. A further subsection (sec­
tion 7(2)) subjects all law in force as well as all administrative decisions taken 
and acts performed to the provisions o f the chapter for so long as it is in ope­
ration. This provision should be read with section 33(2) which states that no 
provision o f the constitution and no rule o f law (whether it be a rule o f common 
or customary law or o f legislation) shall limit any right entrenched in chapter 3 in 
a way other than that provided for in section 33(1) (see 3.4 below).
What such an approach entails, cannot be fiilly explained within the confines of the present 
article, and for a fuller exposition I can but refer to another series of articles which I co- 
authored, namely Du Plessis & Dc Ville (1993a, 1993b and 1993c).
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“Appropriate re lief’ can be sought when an entrenched right is infringed or 
threatened (section 7(4)(a)) and prospective applicants’ right to approach a court 
on these grounds is defined extensively (section 7(4)(b)) so as to include, for in­
stance, standing to bring an action in the interest o f somebody else (section 
7(4)(b)(iii)) or o f a group or class of persons (section 7(4)(b)(iv)) or in the public 
interest (section 7(4)(b)(v)).
These ostensibly unceremonious opening statements o f chapter 3 read with sec­
tion 4(1) which declares the constitution to be “the supreme law o f the Republic”, 
indeed herald a Copemican revolution in South African law and the legal system. 
For the first time in the history o f this country a sovereign constitution construed 
and applied by the judiciary and, in particular, a specialist constitutional court2 
which will hopefully be o f balanced composition, will trump legislative and ex­
ecutive notions o f what just and equitable governance entails.
Chapter 3, in other words, forms the basis o f a system o f cross- and double­
checking which curbs the powers o f the legislature and the executive. In concrete 
terms this means that any law violating a religious right or freedom can be struck 
down by an appropriate court o f  law and that any administrative act which has 
this effect can be undone in a similar way and its damaging consequences can, as 
far as possible, be repaired.
It was a matter o f contention among parties participating in the Multi-Party Nego­
tiating Process whether the provisions o f chapter 3 should be enforceable against 
the state and its organs only or whether they should bind both the state and pri­
vate social institutions and persons. In the end it was agreed that the chapter 
should operate vertically only3 but that provision be made for a seepage to ho­
rizontal relationships. As a result a subsection was included in the interpretation 
clause requiring any court o f law applying and developing the existing law to 
have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects o f the chapter (section 35(3)). 
To allay fears that the predominantly vertical operation o f chapter 3 can be con­
strued as authorising ‘privatised apartheid’, a provision was also included in the 
limitation clause (section 33) permitting measures designed to prohibit unfair dis­
crimination by (private) bodies and persons not explicitly bound by the chapter 
(section 33(4)).
The sections in chapter 3 which entrench religious rights (and other rights ampli­
fying and enhancing them) should therefore be understood subject to the almost
Provided for in sections 98-100 of the transitional constitution.
Hence section 7( 1) which subjects (only) the legislative and executive organs of the state to 
the provisions of chapter 3 -  sec above.
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exclusively vertical operation of the chapter. This means that individual members 
of a religious community will not be able to invoke the provisions o f the chapter 
in order to challenge rules laid down, decisions taken or acts performed by the 
structures o f authority within their communities. The chapter mainly protects 
religious individuals’ and communities’ religious freedom against infringing laws 
and actions from the state (and guarantees non-religious individuals’ and com­
munities’ freedom not to believe in a similar way). “The state” includes, as was 
pointed out at the beginning of this paragraph, the legislature and the executive at 
all levels of government (section 7(1)) as well as statutory bodies and 
functionaries (section 232). This means that, for instance, local authorities, public 
broadcasters such as the SABC and universities are also bound by the chapter 
and that any conduct on their part which is allegedly discriminatory on religious 
grounds or which impinges on religious freedom, will be challengeable in terms of 
chapter 3.
The seepage to horizontal relationships provided for in the interpretation clause 
(section 35(3)) may also affect the existing (common and statutory) law regulat­
ing the relationship between religious communities and their members. Because 
any court o f law applying and developing the existing law is required to have due 
regard to the spirit, purport and objects o f chapter 3, the courts will probably in­
terpret and apply the law regulating horizontal relationships as much as possible 
in conformity with the rights enshrined in the chapter. The relationship between 
an individual member and his or her religious community is -  in so far as the 
member is subject to the community’s structures o f authority -  at any rate not a 
purely ‘horizontal’ relationship. The reason for having a bill o f rights as the in­
dividual’s instrument o f protection against the abuse o f  authority by the state 
therefore also exists (in principle) in the case o f religious communities. The 
courts may therefore be inclined to incorporate the values enshrined in chapter 3 
into the existing law dealing with the relationship between the structures o f autho­
rity o f a religious community and its individual members.
The previously mentioned section 33(4), which authorises measures designed to 
prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and persons not referred to in section 7(1) 
and therefore not explicitly bound by chapter 3, makes it possible for the state to 
interfere with the ‘private’ relationship between an individual and his or her relig­
ious community in order to prevent religion from being used as a pretext for 
(privatised) discrimination.
3.3 Its interpretation (and international law)
A court o f law interpreting chapter 3 is, first o f all, required to “promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality” (section 35(1)). The exact implications o f this value statement will have
Koers 59(2) 1994:151-168 157
The protection o f  religious rights in South A frica's transitional constitution
to be spelt out by the South African courts (and especially the constitutional 
court) in due course.
Section 35(1) goes on to state that a court o f law interpreting chapter 3 “shall, 
where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the pro­
tection o f the rights entrenched in this Chapter,4 and may have regard to compa­
rable foreign case law” (my italics -  LMdP). The second part o f this statement 
clearly authorises a court to consult, in its own discretion, comparable constitu­
tional case-law o f any other country and probably also o f international forums, 
such as the European Court o f Human Rights, which function on a regional basis. 
The first part o f the statement, on the other hand, is mandatory. It stipulates that 
a court o f law shall have regard to binding rules o f  international law thereby hon­
ouring South Africa’s obligations under international law. South Africa is not a 
party to any o f the more significant international human rights conventions, such 
as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Some o f the norms for hu­
man rights protection enshrined in these covenants (and in the Universal Declara­
tion o f Human Rights),5 also form part o f customary international human rights 
law binding on every state irrespective o f whether it has ratified any international 
human rights convention or covenant (Henkin, 1985:271). Some o f these norms 
vouch for religious freedom6 and are part and parcel o f public international law 
applicable to the religious rights entrenched in chapter 3 o f South Africa’s transi­
tional constitution. A court o f  law, in interpreting those provisions o f chapter 3 
relating to religious freedom, is therefore required to have regard to the said 
norms o f customary international law.
3.4 The limitation and suspension of entrenched rights
It is generally accepted that rights enshrined in a bill o f rights are limitable. It is, 
however, an open question whether it is possible to limit all such rights. The 
right to religious freedom, for instance, entails religious practices which are surely 
susceptible to circumscription, but the right to freedom o f conscience or belief, 
which is not so concretely ‘exercised’, lacks these readily circumscribable mani­
festations. On the other hand, there are certain rights which is generally believed
I.e. chapter 3.
And further amplified in the U N. General Assembly’s Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief (proclaimed 
on 25 November 1981) -  see also Ramcharan (1987).
For the evolution of universal standards of religious liberty, see Ramcharan (1987).
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should  not be limited, for instance the right not to be subject to torture (see sec­
tion 11(2)).
Section 33(1) o f South Africa’s transitional constitution is a general circumscrip­
tion clause providing for the limitation of all the rights entrenched in chapter 3 
and therefore also the religious rights entrenched in section 14 (see 4. below) as 
well as the rights amplifying and enhancing them (see 5. below). The limitation 
of any right can be achieved through ‘law o f general application’ (in other words, 
legal rules which apply generally and not solely to an individual case) provided 
that:
(i) the right in question is limited only to the extent that it is reasonable and  
“justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equal­
ity” (section 33(1 )(a)), and
(ii) its essential content is not negated (section 33(1 )(b)).
A list o f illimitable rights is included in some bills o f rights. Illimitability in this 
particularly technical sense does not, however, mean that the right in question can 
in actual fact not be limited at all but merely that it is not limitable by law o f  gen­
eral application in the way described above. ‘Illimitable’ rights can still be lim­
ited by other rights entrenched in the bill o f rights (Du Plessis & De Ville, 
1993c:385). Since chapter 3 of the transitional constitution is not a full bill of 
rights, it was deemed inadvisable to include a list o f illimitable rights in section 
33(1) because their limitation in terms of the incomplete list o f rights included in 
the chapter itself could be ineffectual.
The limitation o f certain specified rights is subject to a stricter test than the one 
which normally applies: their limitation must, in addition to being reasonable, 
also be necessary (section 33(1 )(aa) and (bb)). Among the rights in this category 
are the rights to freedom of religion, belief and opinion entrenched in section 
14(1) (see section 33(l)(aa)).
Section 34 provides for strict conditions on which rights can be suspended during 
a state o f emergency, but here all the rights entrenched in section 14 have been 
listed with those rights which can, even under these circumstances and on the said 
strict conditions, not be suspended (section 34(5)(c)).
Religious freedom is no doubt high on the priority list o f basic freedoms singled 
out for protection in national as well as international human rights instruments. 
Some regard it as “the most sacred o f all freedoms” (Robertson, 1991:124) and it 
“appeared as the first fundamental human right in political instruments o f both 
national and international character long before the idea o f systematic protection 
o f civil and political rights was developed” (Partsch, 1981:209; see also Robert­
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son, 1991:124).7 Rights which are so eminently fundamental are, in terms o f in­
ternational human rights standards, usually regarded as non-derogatable8 which 
means that they cannot be suspended even in time o f a publicly proclaimed emer­
gency when the life o f the nation is threatened.9 Accordingly, article 4(2) o f the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly provides for the 
non-derogatibility o f the religious rights and freedoms enshrined in article 18. 
The rule of non-derogatibility has probably also become part o f customary inter­
national law binding on every state irrespective o f whether it is a party to any in­
ternational convention or covenant (Henkin, 1985:271; see also 3.3 above).
Permissible limitations furthermore seem to apply exclusively to the freedom to 
manifest religious beliefs and not to the freedom to hold  them (Partsch, 1981:210; 
see also 4 below). In the same vein freedom o f conscience, thought and opinion, 
in so far as they have not been concretely manifested, are probably also illimit­
able.
The limitation o f religious rights could prove to be more problematic than may 
appear at first sight. No state could possibly permit, for example, enforced po­
lygamy, ritual murders or public disturbance in the name o f exercising religious 
freedom (Robertson, 1991:125): limitations on religious practices which endan­
ger life or health or contravene public morals should, in other words, somehow be 
permissible (Partsch, 1981:212 n. 11 at 447).10 On the other hand, tyrannical 
regimes often profess to guarantee the free exercise of religion while, at the same 
time, they suppress full expression o f its political and social consequences, and 
do so in the name o f justifiably circumscribing concrete manifestations o f  relig­
ious freedom (Robertson, 1991:124). This happened, to a large extent, in South 
Africa under the apartheid regime (Robertson, 1991:126-127). The lines o f de-
' See e.g. the first paragraph of the Agreement of the People (of England) of 28 October 
1647 The First Amendment to the U S Constitution, which deals with religious freedom 
at a federal level, was proposed in 1789 (the same year in which the constitution itself 
came into operation) and was ratified shortly after the commencement of the constitution -  
sec Van der Vyver (1972:104).
** With reference to section 34 of South Africa’s transitional constitution ‘non-derogatable’ 
must be read as ‘non-suspendablc’.
® See also Ramcharan (1985:14-17) and Gormlcy (1985) with regard to the non-derogata- 
bility of the right to life.
10 Partsch (1981:212), in his discussion of the protection of religious freedom under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, observes that astonishingly ample and 
broad limitations of the right to manifest one’s religion have been admitted He docs not, 
however, spell out exactly why he thinks so.
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marcation between justifiable and unjustifiable circumscriptions o f religious free­
dom to act (see 4 below) often become blurred because
... both religion and politics embrace in differing ways the whole of human 
life. Both religious movements and political movements/governments have 
their own view of what human beings, individually and collectively, should 
be. While religions stem from and work in areas of inspiration and convic­
tion, political movements are concerned with maintaining the social and le­
gal framework for the human community (Robertson, 1991:125).11
Chapter 3 of South Africa’s transitional constitution undoubtedly conforms to in­
ternationally recognised standards for the protection o f religious freedom by 
explicitly providing for the non-derogatability o f the religious rights guaranteed in 
section 14. Since the limitation o f these rights is subject to the stricter necessity 
test, the door is open for a court to conclude that the freedom to manifest relig­
ious beliefs is limitable, but that the freedom to hold  them is not.
4. R eligious rights in section 14
Section 14 o f the transitional constitution provides as follows:
Religion, belief and opinion
14. (1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, relig­
ion, thought belief and opinion, which shall include academic free­
dom in institutions of higher learning.
(2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), religious 
observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions 
under rules established by an appropriate authority for that purpose 
provided that such observances are conducted on an equitable basis 
and attendance at them is free and voluntary.
(3) Nothing in this Constitution shall preclude legislation recognising -
(a) personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a 
particular religion; and
(b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of 
religious law subject to specified procedures.
For a deserving exposition of the interaction between (and, indeed, interdependence of) 
law/politics and religion, see also Witte (1993).
Koers 59(2) 1994:151-168 161
The protection o f  religious rights in South Africa's transitional constitution
The W.C.R.P.-S.A. proposed clause (see 1. above) reads as follows:
1. All persons are entitled:
1.1 to freedom of conscience,
1.2 to profess, practise, and propagate any religion or no religion,
1.3 to change their religious allegiance.
2. Every religious community and/or member thereof shall enjoy the right:
2.1 to establish, maintain and manage religious institutions;
2.2 to have their particular system of family law recognised by the 
state;
2.3 to criticise and challenge all social and political structures and 
policies in terms of the teachings of their religion.
Section 14(1) o f the transitional constitution is libertarian in its purport and there 
can be little doubt that it provides, in a highly individualised way, for freedom of 
conscience, the right to profess, practise and propagate any religion and the right 
to change one’s religious allegiance. To this extent it is in conformity with the 
first subclause o f the W.C.R.P.-S.A. proposed clause. Religion, however, also 
has an institutional dimension -  as appears from 2.1 o f the W.C.R.P.-S.A. pro­
posed clause. This institutional dimension (which the W .C.R.P.-S.A. proposed 
clause expresses as a right “to establish, maintain and manage religious institu­
tions”) is catered for under the freedom o f association clause (section 17) in the 
transitional constitution but it can also be argued that it is already contained in 
section 14(1) as it stands: religious freedom by its very nature indeed entails all 
rights relating to a person’s involvement with a religious community. The argu­
ment that the freedoms listed in section 14(1) should be read as including the en­
titlement to have them institutionally expressed, is supported by the fact that aca­
demic freedom (which is one o f the freedoms explicitly listed in section 14(1)) is 
mentioned with reference to its concretisation in institutions o f higher learning.12 
It can thus be argued that on the analogy o f academic freedom, the distinction 
between an establishment and a free exercise clause which is explicit in the First 
Amendment to the United States constitution (see also Van der Vyver, 1972:108),
Strictly ‘logically’ speaking the opposite can of coursc also be argued on an indusio unius 
est alterius exclusio basis: becausc the institutional dimension of academic freedom is 
mentioned explicitly, the absencc of explicit reference to the institutional dimension of 
religious freedom implies that, at least for purposes of section 14, the constitution-makcrs 
intended to exclude it. However, if a holistic and purposive approach to the interpretation 
of the bill of rights is followed (see 3.1 above) and entitlements arc construed liberally, an 
analogical extension of the academic freedom formula to religious freedom is more 
appropriate than its inclusio unius restriction Both approaches arc, at any rate, equally 
‘logical’. See also 3.1 (iii) above.
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is implicit in the freedom o f religion dimension of section 14(1). But even with­
out such an analogy the ‘establishment’ aspect o f section 14(1) is borne out by a 
holistic interpretation which relates the provisions o f this section to the entrench­
ment (in section 17) of the right to freely associate.
The combination o f religious and academic freedom in section 14(1) is unusual. 
The example (and, indeed, the wording) of article 21(b) o f the Constitution o f the 
Republic of Namibia was followed by the drafters of South Africa’s transitional 
bill o f rights. In the Namibian article academic freedom and the freedom to prac­
tise religion are, however, entrenched in two different sub-articles, namely arti­
cles 19(b) and (c) respectively. Because o f the tug of war between the minimal­
ists and the optimalists who were involved in multi-party negotiations (see 2. 
above) the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights refrained from explicitly 
referring to academic freedom in the initial drafts o f chapter 3. The committee 
was o f the opinion that “ freedom of ... thought, belief and opinion” at any rate 
includes academic freedom. A number of submissions were then made to the 
technical committee in which the explicit constitutionalisation o f academic free­
dom and o f the freedom o f artistic creativity and scientific research were advo­
cated. The technical committee recommended to the negotiating council that 
explicit reference be made to academic freedom in section 14(1) and to freedom 
o f artistic creativity and scientific research in the freedom o f expression clause, 
section 15(1). This the council accepted. Note, however, that in both instances 
the wording (introduced by the phrase “which shall include”) suggests that the 
particular freedoms explicitly mentioned are at any rate included in the entitle­
ments initially entrenched in broad and non-specific terms.
Article 5 o f the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities (see 1. 
above) is concerned with people’s enjoyment of religious rights in state institu­
tions and it is precisely this right which section 14(2) «institutionalises. Article 5 
does not, however, deal with educational institutions while section 14(2) includes 
them. In this sense section 14(2) to some extent supports the right to religious 
education elaborated on in article 4 o f the declaration although section 32(c) of 
the transitional constitution is more to the point in this regard.
The concern raised about systems of family law in 2.2 o f the W.C.R.P.-S.A. pro­
posed clause is catered for in section 14(3) of the transitional constitution. A per­
son’s right to have his or her system of family law recognised by the state is, 
however, not constitutionalised. Instead the section authorises the legislature to 
pass legislation recognising this right. The provisional nature o f section 14(3) is 
due to the fact that the question of recognising the systems of family law of relig­
ious communities was raised at a very late stage of the negotiating process and in 
conjunction with the highly controversial customary law issue. Although the ne­
gotiating council was amenable to the constitutional recognition o f these systems,
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it was probably well advised to proceed with circumspection. Religious groups 
will now have to lobby the legislature elected on 27 April 1994 to pass the neces­
sary legislation in this regard. Section 14(3) will then safeguard such legislation 
against invalidation on, for instance, the ground that it favours certain persons or 
religious communities and is therefore discriminatory.
5. Rights am plifying and enhancing freedom o f religion
Due to the economy o f language characterising chapter 3 (see 3.1 above) relig­
ious rights and freedoms are not referred to elaborately -  as is obvious from sec­
tion 14. Other provisions of the chapter can, however, be construed as favouring 
the exercise o f religious freedom thereby amplifying and enhancing the provisions 
of section 14. These provisions will now briefly be looked at.
5.1 Education
Section 32 o f the transitional constitution guarantees individuals’ right to basic 
education, to equal access to education (section 32(a)) and to instruction in a lan­
guage o f choice where reasonably practicable (section 32(b)). Section 32(c) then 
proceeds to give “every person” the right
to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common 
culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no discrimination 
on the ground of race (my italics -  LMdP).
Section 32(c) adequately addresses the sentiments o f religious groups articulated 
in articles 4.5 and 4.6 o f the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities. 
Under the said section it will be possible for religious communities to establish 
and maintain their own educational institutions at pre-school, primary, secondary 
and tertiary levels. That these institutions will have a right to financial support by 
the state (subject to compliance with minimum academic norms laid down by 
educational authorities) is, however, not a foregone conclusion (see below).
The section furthermore excludes recourse to religious freedom as a pretext for 
privatised racial (but not necessarily gender) discrimination. Reference has not 
been made to gender discrimination in order not to preclude the possibility of 
having religiously oriented single-sex schools.
Does section 32(c) warrant the constitutionality o f a provision such as section 
31(1) o f the Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys 
(Private) Act (19 o f 1950) which requires from the council o f the university to 
ensure that, in appointing academic and non-academic staff, the Christian histori­
cal character o f the university is maintained? At first sight it appears as if it does, 
but the matter is not without its complications. It is important to note that the
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university as a statutory body is bound by the provisions o f chapter 3 -  even 
though the chapter operates vertically only (see 3.2 above). If in the appointment 
o f staff members the council o f the university therefore differentiates among pro­
spective candidates on the basis o f religion, its decision could be challenged on 
the strength o f the equality clause (section 8(1) and (2)) o f the transitional consti­
tution -  see also 5.2 below). It could o f course be argued that section 32(c) in 
effect limits the provisions o f the equality clause but since the principles o f both 
freedom  and equality (see e.g. sections 33(l)(a)(ii) and 35(1) o f the transitional 
constitution) guide the interpretation and application of chapter 3 (see 3.2 above), 
this limitation has to be construed restrictively. The council o f the university 
could therefore act unconstitutionally if it were to exclude someone from ap­
pointment simply because his or her religion does not conform to the ‘Christian 
historical character o f the university’. An atheist unlikely to undermine the said 
character will, for example, not only be eligible for appointment but could indeed 
challenge a decision o f the council excluding him or her from appointment mainly 
on the basis o f his or her atheistic beliefs.
O f more significance still are the standards laid down in article 13(3) o f the Inter­
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This article guaran­
tees the right o f parents to “ensure the religious and moral education o f their 
children in conformity with their own convictions” but at the same time it states 
that this right can be exercised by parents choosing “schools ... other than those 
established by the public authorities” . From this follows that “ [t]he state is not 
obliged to finance such education but only to tolerate it if  the parents wish to 
provide for it or pay for it” (Partsch, 1981:213). Thus, even if it could be argued 
that the article 13(3) standards apply to tertiary education as well, it seems as 
though a future South African government will not be out o f step with interna­
tional human rights standards should it recognise the right o f the Potchefstroom 
University for Christian Higher Education to maintain its ‘Christian historical 
character’ without, however, supporting the institution financially. On the other 
hand, the mere fact that the right to establish an educational institution on the ba­
sis o f a common religion is regarded as o f sufficient significance to constitutional- 
ise it in explicit terms, could serve as a basis for an argument that the state is un­
der an obligation to provide financially for such an institution. No South African 
university will at any rate be able to survive without financial support from the 
state.
5.2 Equality
Article 2 o f the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities is adamant 
in proclaiming the equality before the law of religious communities. Section 8 of 
the transitional constitution is equally adamant in proclaiming every person’s 
“equality before the law and ... equal protection o f the law” (section 8(1)) in pur­
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suance of which discrimination on the grounds o f (amongst others) religion, con­
science or belief are precluded (section 8(2)).
Ironically, however, the voluminous (and apprehensive) submissions on the 
equality provision in the transitional constitution which came from spokespersons 
o f religious communities did not address the entrenchment o f religious equality 
but rather the stipulation (in section 8(2)) that “no person shall be unfairly dis­
criminated against” on the ground o f “sexual orientation” .
5.3 Expression, association, language and culture
The freedom o f expression clause in the transitional constitution (section 15(1)) 
certainly caters for the need o f religious communities to “criticise and challenge 
all social and political structures and policies in terms o f  the teachings of their 
religion” (see 2.3 of the W.C.R.P.-S.A. proposed clause). The transitional consti­
tution (section 15(2)) moreover provides that “media financed by or under the 
control o f the state shall be regulated in a manner which ensures impartiality and 
the expression o f a diversity o f opinion” . This goes a long way in addressing re­
ligious communities’ concern about having “reasonable access to ... publicly- 
owned communications media” (article 7 of the Declaration on Religious Rights 
and Responsibilities).
As was pointed out previously, the freedom o f association clause in the transi­
tional constitution (section 17) enhances the institutionalised exercise o f religious 
freedom -  as does section 31 (on language and cultural rights) for religious com­
munities to whom the exercise of their religious freedom is closely related to or 
dependent on language and culture.
5.4 Access to court and administrative justice
Members o f religious communities, like all other bodies and persons, “ shall have 
the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court o f  law or, where appropri­
ate, another independent and impartial forum” (section 22). This means that 
members o f a religious community can (as o f right) have recourse to either a court 
of law or ‘an outside referee’ should they not be able to resolve their disputes 
among themselves. Strictly speaking, the section in the transitional constitution 
on administrative justice (section 24) does not bind religious communities, since 
the chapter on fundamental rights operates vertically only (see 3.2 above). How­
ever, the requirement that religious communities should comply with the precepts 
o f natural justice in instances where the rights o f any o f their members stand to be 
affected by decisions, forms part o f the law as it stands. The provision in the 
transitional constitution allowing for a seepage o f the provisions o f chapter 3 to 
horizontal relationships (section 35(3)) could therefore well be taken as reinforc-
166 Koers 59(2) 1994:151-168
Lourens M. du Plessis
ing the right o f any member of a religious community to the application of (what 
in legal nomenclature is known as) the rules o f  natural justice  in instances where 
disputes between the member and the religious community concerned are to be 
resolved. These rules require that both sides to a dispute be heard (audi et al­
teram partem ) and that no person involved in the dispute can be judge in his or 
her own cause (nemo iudex in re sua) .13
6. C oncluding perspective
Chapter 3 o f the transitional constitution provides a broad framework within 
which religious rights and freedoms (and rights relating to them) are entrenched. 
It is now for religious communities themselves to spell out exactly what the ac- 
tualisation o f these rights and freedoms means in practice. The W.C.R.P.-S.A. 
Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities is a noteworthy starting 
point in this regard. The courts (and especially the constitutional court) could 
well consult declarations or charters o f this nature in order to give content to the 
religious (and related) rights and freedoms entrenched in broad terms in the bill o f 
rights.
Religious communities are also under an obligation to make their members aware 
o f their rights and o f the implications o f the entrenchment o f those rights in chap­
ter 3. Rights are worth nothing if they are simply listed in and elaborated on in 
lofty statements. They are there to be used in order to help optimalise the fulfil­
ment o f one’s calling in all the various spheres o f life. This holds, in particular, 
for the rights o f religious people and communities.
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